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ABSTRACT
CONSISTENCY/INCONSISTENCY
BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PLANES
Onur Ozgur
M.A. in Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray 
August 1998
In this study, we introduce a different mechanism with a hybrid ownership definition lying in between 
public and private ownership. Agents have claims over the endowments and the total production of the 
economy instead of having absolute ownership rights. We define social desirability as the following: an 
alternative x is socially preferred to an alternative y if the majority of the agents prefer x to y. In this 
context, we investigate whether the competitive equilibrium outcome is socially the most desirable 
outcome and whether there are other efficient outcomes socially preferred to the competitive equilibrium 
outcome. We use a voting scheme where agents vote on the production alternatives of the economy. We 
investigate if there is a voting rule that leads to the competitive equilibrium outcome and what kind of a 
rule this latter is. The central finding of the study is that, for a class of production and utility functions, 
there is a voting rule that leads to the competitive equilibrium outcome. Moreover, this is a weighted 
voting rule where agents’ votes are their initial claims. A second important contribution is the analysis of 
the process of candidate nomination, which is most of the time, neglected by social choice problems. 
Finally, we consider the transfer problem where agents make transfers to other agents to make them vote 
on specific alternatives.
Keywords: Social choice, political economy, voting behaviour, information, models of political processes.
ÖZET
i k t i s a d i  v e  s i y a s i  d ü z l e m l e r  ARASINDA
TUTARLILIK/TUTARSIZLIK
Onur Ozgur
iktisat Bolumu, Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray 
Ağustos 1998
Bu çalışmada, kamu ve özel mülkiyet kavramlarinin ortasinda kalan bir mülkiyet kavramini içinde 
bulunduran yeni bir mekanizma tanimliyoruz. Insanlarin elinde mutlak mülkiyet haklari yerine, 
ekonominin tum varliklari ve üretimi üzerinden aldiklari paylar var. Toplumsal tercihi söyle tanimliyoruz: 
Eğer toplumun buyuk bir kesimi x alternatifini y alternatifine tercih ediyorsa, x alternatifi toplumsal olarak 
daha cok isteniyor demektir. Bu bağlamda, rekabetçi dengenin toplumsal olarak en cok istenen seçenek 
olup olmadigini ve başka verimli olan ve rekabetçi dengeye toplumsal olarak tercih edilen seçenekler olup 
olmadigini arastiriyoruz. Bunu yaparken, insanlarin üretim alternatifleri üzerine oy verdikleri bir oylama 
sistemi kullaniyoruz. Rekabetçi piyasa dengesine götüren bir oylama kurali var midir ve eğer varsa bu ne 
tur bir oylama kuralidir sorularina yanit ariyoruz. Calismanin en önemli bulgusu, verili bir üretim ve haz 
fonksiyonlari sinifi için, böyle bir oylama kuralinin varolduğudur. Ayrica da, bu kural, insanlara toplam 
üretim ve varliklardan aldiklari pay oranlarinin agirlik olarak verildiği bir agirlikli oylama kuralidir. ikinci 
önemli katkimiz ise, sosyal secim kurami tarafından cogu zaman es geçilen ve önemli olduğunu 
düşündüğümüz aday gösterme surecinin analizidir. Son olarak da, insanlarin diğer grup insanlara belirli bir 
üretim alternatifini oylatmak için transfer yaptiklari bir modelin analizini sunuyoruz.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Sosyal secim kurami, siyasal iktisat, oylama davranislari, bilgi, siyasi surec modelleri.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The debate between the defenders of private ownership and public ownership has 
a long history and a deep impact on political and economic theory. Several authors have 
taken positions on the public side. Rawls (1971), Roemer (1986), Cohen (1986) are the 
ones that one can come across in the literature. The common point they focus on is that 
natural resources should remain in public ownership to prevent anyone from extracting 
excessive benefits from the private ownership o f producing some commodity.
The crucial argument that makes neo-classical allocation mechanisms under 
private ownership the mainstream one is the fact that they lead to “efficiency”. Agents 
making decisions selfishly, to maximise their own utilities, leads to social optimum. The 
concept o f competitive equilibrium is the outcome of this paradigm, which argues that 
agents are totally free in making their decisions and these freely made decisions pave the 
way to the efficient outcome. Now, the questions to be asked are: “Is this competitive 
equilibrium allocation socially the most desirable one?”. “Are not there other efficient 
points at least as desirable as the competitive equilibrium point?”.
What determines whether an outcome is socially more desirable than the other? It 
is apparent that there are an infinite number of other “efficient” points on the production 
possibilities frontier o f an economy.
We can define social desirability in the context of social choice theory and voting 
procedures, specifically. By voting procedures, we mean the rules that govern how votes
in an election are aggregated and how a winner or winners are determined. All the human 
populations live under one type of a social contract or another. And the majority of these 
groups live under systems of which periodic elections are an important part. The crucial 
criteria which are highly valued by these systems are fairness, neutrality and anonymity. 
Anonymity says that each voter’s opinion should be equally important (one man, one 
vote); Neutrality says that no candidate should be a priori discriminated against (Moulin 
(1994)). A very simple definition of social desirability could be the following: An 
alternative x is socially more desirable than an alternative y if the number of agents that 
prefer alternative x to alternative y is larger than the number of agents that prefer y to x.
We introduce a model economy with a “hybrid” ownership definition, that lies in- 
between public and private ownership. This is such an economy where agents have 
claims over the total production and the initial endowments but they are not the absolute 
owners of them. Redefining ownership this way has a nice use. Had we given the agents 
absolute ownership rights over the endowments, a public decision upon what to produce 
would be inappropriate since no one would have the right to compel another to allocate 
his endowment to a production alternative that he does not like. In our case, this type of a 
common decision is meaningful.
Then, we ask the following questions: “Is there a voting rule that sustains the 
competitive equilibrium outcome given the aggregated preferences of the agents? What 
kind of a rule is this?”. “Is the outcome that this rule selects socially the most desirable 
one?”. We provide answers to these questions with the help of our new model economy.
The literature on allocation of resources by voting follows two broad paths. One is 
the literature on the allocation of public goods. Deciding whether or not to undertake a
public project and how to distribute the cost o f it to the public is the classic problem of 
this genre. Most of the attention has been given to the design of optimal mechanisms 
under conditions o f asymmetric information. Clarke (1971), Slutsky (1977), Groves and 
Ledyard (1977), Harris and Townsend (1981), Jackson and Moulin (1992) are the typical 
examples to cite.
The second type of work considers the corporate voting literature. This field of 
research has focused primarily on the following two issues: the assignment of votes in 
relation to income claims within a corporation, and the selection of the voting percentage 
required to transfer control of a corporation (Barzel and Sass(1990)). Classic and more 
recent works to cite in this area are DeAngelo (1981), Easterbrook and Fischel (1983), 
Nitzan and Procaccia (1986), Grossman and Hart (1980), and Harris and Raviv (1988).
The paper is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, we formulate the problem and 
introduce the model. We provide the intuition behind our definition of ownership and 
undertake a standard general equilibrium analysis. In Chapter 3, we deal with the issue of 
nominating the candidates, which we think is one of the most crucial steps in the 
selection of a socially desirable outcome, and is almost always neglected by Social 
Choice theorists. Chapter 4 brings with it a different approach to look at the market 
mechanism through the use of transfers. Chapter 5 summarises and concludes.
Chapter 2 
The Model
We consider a polarised economy with production. There are 2 firms each 
producing one o f the two goods of the economy, namely good A and good B. Both firms 
use the same and the only input of the economy. K, and Kj denote the amounts o f input 
allocated to firml and firm2, respectively, where Kj+Kj^C, the total amount o f input in 
the economy. Pa? Pb? and w are the prices of good A and good B and the input in that 
order. Firms’ production functions are of the following form: f,(K ,)=aK / for the first 
firm and f2(K2)=bK2’' for the second firm, where a,b>0 and 0<y<l (We also consider the 
linear case where y=l, separately). Firms maximise profit. They are owned publicly, 
meaning that the agents in the economy are the shareholders of the firms and they have 
different claims over the total profits. Shareholders constitute the two groups of 
consumers in the economy, namely groupl (informally A-lovers) and group2 (B-lovers). 
There are n, (>0) and nj (>0) identical agents in groupl and group2. The agents in both 
groups have Cobb-Douglas utility functions defined over the bundles of goods, meaning 
that they value both goods but they love one o f the goods more than the other:
U ¡{x '^ ,X ‘b  ^= { ^ b where ttj (>0) and (3j (>0) are the parameters of the utility
functions of i* group, i=l,2 and and are the i* type agents’ demands for good A 
and good B. a , >a·^ , meaning that agents in the first group like to consume good A more 
than the agents in the second group. ai+Pj=l (this is not a serious restriction since utility
functions represent the same preferences up to increasing transformations). Each agent in 
group i (i=l,2) is endowed with S|C amount o f input and receives Sj o f the total profits 
generated by the firms, where s>0. We normalise the shares so that n,s,+n2S2= l.
2.1 The General Case with a Strictly Concave Technology
A standard general equilibrium analysis is conducted. The competitive 
equilibrium levels o f production and individual demand functions are calculated.
Firms ’problem
Firms maximise profits and the profits are distributed to the agents according to 
their shares. Firms solve the following problem:
maxP^aKl -wK^
s.t. O^AT, (1)
and
maxPjhATj -wK^
s.t. 0<Af,
given Pa, Pb, w >0
After imposing the market clearing condition K,+K2=C. The equilibrium input bundles to 
be allocated to firml and firm 2 are the following:
K , =
C { P , a Y  
{ P , a Y  + { P , b y (2)
Kг  =
C { P , b y
{ P , a Y  + { P , b y
(3)
where S  =
\ - y
By determining (KuKj), we have also determined the point on the production 
possibilities frontier the firms want to produce at, given the prices. Here is the price o f the 
input determined by the first-order conditions:
w = rC
r-i
(4)
We denote by fl, and I lj the profits generated by firml and firm2 respectively:
^  ( \ - r ) a { p , g )
(5)
n ,  =
{ \ - r ) C ’ (^P,b)‘
(6)
Since the income stream generated by profits and input price is common to each 
individual’s demand function, we compute it here:
w C + r i j  +  r i2  —
+ (\-r )(7 ^ P ,a )' + {P ,b f
{ P ,a f + { P ,b ) ‘
V-1 (7)
Having worked out the firms’ demand of inputs, we move onto the consumers’ side.
Consumers ’problem
Consumers solve the following problem:
m a x ( x ‘ ) ‘" ( x ; f
s.t.
/ > , X > P . X l £ i , [ w C + n , + n , ]
x i . x j a o
given Pa , Pb , ^^>0
(8)
The optimal demand functions are the following:
^  =
=
x ;  =
_ a ,5, r C ’ * ( P , b Y ) ' \
P a { { P , a Y + { P , b Y Y - '
_ ' r C '  + Y - y ) C ' a P , a Y  + ( P , b Y ) '
P b Y P , a Y  + ( P , b Y y - '
_  ^ 2 ^ 2 ' r C '  + ( 1 -  r ) C '  ( ( P , a Y  + ( P . b Y Y
P a ( ( P , a Y  + ( P , b Y y - '
_ ' r C '  + ( \ - y ) C ' a P , a Y  + ( _ P , b Y Y
P b ( ( P , a Y  + ( P , b Y y - '
(9)
Market Clearing
Here are the market clearing conditions:
n , X \ + n , X l  =aK(  
n^Xl+n^Xl =bKl (10)
We know that there exists a positive price vector that satisfies the above equations'.
Most wanted points
We have two groups with different preferences over the bundles of the two goods 
of the economy. Due to this, the points on the production possibilities frontier that the 
agents in two groups want to be at the most are different. Both groups solve the following 
problem to select these points:
max
n, J V “ »· /n,
See Appendix for the proof of the existence.
s.t.
+ K ^< c
( 11)
The optimal solutions for the resource allocation problem they considered are 
summarised below Figure 1, where A* and B* are the most-preferred points of the first 
and second type agents.
Finally, we have a rough figure o f the production possibilities frontier (PPF), the 
competitive equilibrium point and the most-wanted points of both groups.
Figure 1; The PPF of the strictly concave case.
A*: most-wanted point for A-lovers, K l= a,C , K2=P,C.
B*: most-wanted point for B-lovers, K l= a 2C, K2=P2C.
D*: competitive equilibrium point, K l=  njS,aj+n2S2a 2, K2= niSjP,+n2S2P2·
• a,=a,(n,s,+n2S2)= a,n,s,+a,n2S2>a,n,s,+a2n2S2 (a,>a2) => A,*>D,*
• p,=p,(n,s,+n2S2)= p,n,s,+p,n2S2<pin,s,+p2n2S2 (Pi<p2) => A2*<D2*
It is easy to show by a similar comparison that and B2*>D2* . So, we
have A1*>D1*>B1* and A2*<D2*<B2*. The analysis concludes that the competitive 
equilibrium is always between the two groups’ most preferred points.
When the preferences of both types are the same, the above-mentioned points 
coincide at the competitive equilibrium. More interesting case is where the preferences 
are different and the competitive equilibrium point is between the most-wanted points.
It is finally the right time to ask the most important question of the paper. Does 
there exist a voting rule that selects the competitive equilibrium outcome given the 
aggregated preferences of the society? Our answer to this question is positive. The 
exciting result is that the quantities of inputs allocated to the production alternatives are, 
explicitly, linear combinations of the most-wanted points of both groups where the 
weights are simply njSj.
Now, we design a voting scheme that leads to the competitive equilibrium 
outcome. We let the agents vote on the three possible points on the PPF. It is apparent 
that each agent votes for the point he wants to be at the most. Contrary would be 
meaningless since the rule is a weighted average of these points and there is no incentive 
for an agent in one of those groups to vote for one o f the other two points. At this point, 
we do not know whether the vote weights that agents have are equal. Later, we show that 
they must be different in order for the voting rule to select the competitive equilibrium 
outcome.
Let Si denote the vote that agents in the i* group have. Agents in the first group 
vote on A* and the agents in the second group vote on B*. There are n,+n2 votes, n, for 
A* and nj for B*. Then, the ratio of K, to K2 is the following:
K^ _  , +  « 2^2^2
K 2 n^s^/3^ + « 2 ^ 2 ^ :
( 12)
We also know from (2) and (3) that:
K, _ (P a^ Y a
(P.b) {P,by
(13)
Now, we use the market clearing conditions in (10):
(n ,s ,a i  +n^s - ^a^Yr+{{ -YY( f l ‘ ) + (P J})‘ ^ a ^  + ( P J } f )  = a ‘
+  n,s,pyir  +(1  -  r \(a ‘) +  +  (^P,bY) =  (P,b)‘
Dividing the first equation by the second gives us:
( + « 2 ‘5'2t^ 2)______________ _  («iS;Of)+ « 2^20 2^)
+ ^ 252^ 2) (^ a ^ )  ^ 2  ■*’ ^2‘^ 2^2)
(14)
(15)
=i> S', =Sy and ?2 = ■ 2^ is ^ solution to the equation.
Thus, a voting rule where each agent is given a vote equal to his claim over the 
total produce, leads us to the competitive equilibrium. This very fact shades light on a 
number of questions in om· mind. The crucial one is whether the projection o f the
problem o f resource allocation on the economic plane to the political one satisfies certain 
criteria. The criteria we have in mind are anonymity and neutrality. We saw that the 
answer is not positive. Suppose each agent had been given equal votes and that a 
majoritarian voting rule had been applied. The outcome would have been the point on the 
PPF which is the most-wanted point o f the more populated group. What if  we use a 
mixture o f both procedures, namely each one having an equal vote but a weighted voting 
rule is applied. Here comes “social desirability”. The social outcome would not be one of 
the most-wanted points but it would be closer to the point of the group which is more 
populated. It would exhibit a better representation of the needs and preferences of the 
society.
2.2 Linear Technology
This one is a special case of the model in 2.1, with the only change that the 
production functions of the firms are linear which pave the way to an affine PPF. As 
expected, everything works more smoothly with an affine PPF. A similar general 
equilibrium analysis is conducted and all the demand functions and the production levels 
are calculated.
Firms ’ side
Production functions are of the form f,(K,)=aK, and f2(K2)=bK2 for firml and 
firm2. Here are the firms’ demand for inputs.
K, e ( 0 , C )  ^ ^ 6
K , € ( 0 , C )  P ,  a
(16)
Consumers ’ side
x \  =
X
X
a  , i , a C  
= P ^s^bC  
= a  .^s^aC  
= P^S2bC
Market Clearing
n ^X \  +  «2"^^ =
tl^X ^ ~  6 ^ 2
( 17)
(18)
= C (« i5 ,a , + « 252^ 2)
^2  ~ ^iP-\^\P\
(19)
We have computed the competitive equilibrium production and allocation levels. 
Most-wanted points
A similar analysis to the one made in 2.1 is conducted and the following most-wanted 
points are computed for both groups:
A-lovers: K l= a,C , K2=p,C.
B-lovers: K l = a 2C, K2=p2C.
We again have the figure of the PPF with the competitive equilibrium and the 
most-wanted points on it.
Figure 2: The PPF of the affine case.
Chapter 3
Candidate Nomination
The problems in social choice theory are always constructed given an alternative 
set to choose from. The process of determining these alternatives is not considered. We 
think that this process is important since constraining the set o f alternatives can lead to 
different outcomes.
In our model, we let the agents declare the points on the PPF that they want to be 
at the most, without assuming knowledge of their preferred points. Then, the outcome is 
determined by the weighted voting rule that we defined above. Now, this process is not 
strategy-proof, since declaring a point which is different than the “most-wanted” point 
can lead to the selection of a better outcome for both type agents.
Let 1 > ^ > 0 and 1 > T) > 0. Now, 4 denotes the point chosen by the first type 
agents meaning that Kj=^C, K2=(1-^)C and r] denotes the point chosen by the second 
type agents meaning that Ki=t|C, K2=(l-ii)C. We have the following lemma:
Lemma: Assume that (^,ri) is a NE. If  ^9^1, then the equilibrium outcome is the most 
preferred point of A-lovers. If  T|9i0, then the equilibrium outcome is the most preferred 
point of B-lovers.
Proof: Suppose that ^9^ 1 and that the equilibrium outcome is not the most preferred point 
o f A-lovers. The equilibrium outcome is K,=(n,s,^+n2S2T|)C, K2=(l-(n,s,^+n2S2T|))C. It is
clear that the outcome is feasible for any value of ^ and t| within the given range. Let 
K|*=^* C denote the most preferred point for A-lovers. I f  K,> K,* then declaring a smaller 
^ will make A-lovers better-off If K,< K,‘ then declaring a larger ^ will make A-lovers 
better-off In both cases, A-lovers can do better by deviating, a contradiction to (^,t|) 
being a NE. Hence, the equilibrium outcome is the most preferred point of A-lovers. 
Similarly for the case where ri^ ^O. qed.
From the above Lemma, we know that the case where and T|5t0 is not 
possible. So 1 > ^ > *^ and Tj’ > ti > 0. One can also compute the conditions under which 
(1,0) is aNE.
Chapter 4
Transfer Problem
Here, we provide another approach to analyse the problem o f resource allocation. 
We use the same model described in Section 2. The difference is that instead o f the 
weighted voting rule we used before, we utilise the majoritarian voting rule. This means 
that the alternative that receives more than half of the votes is selected. All the agents 
have equal votes. They vote on their most-wanted points. Without transfer, the outcome 
of this process is the most-wanted point of the more populated group.
In our setup, there is the following asymmetry between the shares and the 
population of the groups. The share that the agents in group2 receive from the total 
production is higher than that of the agents in group 1; but the number o f agents in group 
2 is less than the number of agents in group 1. The problem that the agents in group 2 
solve is the following:
s.t.
s^l J
X'. (5*)(1 + S (x'AA*))"' (x; (A*)f
T„T,> 0 (2 0 )
What agents in group2 try to do is to have the necessary number o f people in 
group2, namely /, vote on the most-wanted point of group2. To achieve this, agents in 
group 2 transfer that amount of good A and good B to those people in group 1 that will 
make them at least as good as they are at their most-wanted point. We provide here a very 
simple example to clarify it:
Let n,=80, 02=20 meaning that 20% of the total population are B-lovers. 
S[=0.0025, S2=0.04. This gives us n,s,=.20 and n2S2=.80 meaning that, although B-lovers 
constitute the minority group, they receive the 80% of the total production.a,=.85 and 
a2=.2. a=b=l and y=.5. After the above problem is solved, we have the following utility 
levels for B-lovers who transferred 7.5% of the amount of good A that they receive at B* 
to 31 A-lovers to make them vote on B*. These people are as good as at A*. B-lovers do 
not care about the remaining A-lovers since they convinced the necessary number of A- 
lovers to make them win the voting.
B-lovers after the transfer: 0.8 
B-lovers would get at D*: 0.8 
B-lovers would get at A*: 0.5
This finding shows that even after the transfers, B-lovers receive a utility level 
that they would get under the competitive equilibrium outcome.
The simulations run for some specific values of the parameters show that there is 
some “grain o f truth” in it .^ In most of the cases, the transfer is feasible in the sense that, 
the utility levels that the agents in group2 get are higher than the utility levels that they 
would get if  the most-wanted point of the first group was selected. More interesting is 
that in some o f the cases, the utility levels that the agents in group2 get are also very close 
to the utility levels that they would get under the competitive equilibrium allocation. *
* The simulation results can be found in the Appendix.
Chapter 5 
Conclusion
In this study, we tried to open a new area of discussion. What if  we use a voting 
model where agents vote on the production alternatives, instead of using the neo-classical 
resource allocation mechanism? This mechanism is new in the sense that we introduced a 
new definition of ownership. This new definition is a “hybrid” one that lies between 
public and private ownership. Instead of having absolute ownership rights on the initial 
endowments and the final production, agents possess initially given claims over the total 
income stream of the economy which is the price that is paid to the agents for their 
providing of the inputs plus the profits generated by the firms. Defining ownership this 
way has a nice use: It allows us to let people vote on the production alternatives o f the 
economy, which would be impossible under the private ownership definition, without 
transfers.
Although there are examples of allocating the scarce resources of the economy by 
voting, they all consider the case of pure public goods where the cost of these goods have 
to be shared by the society. The tool we introduced and used throughout the study aimed 
to analyse whether the competitive equilibrium of the model economy, where the 
allocation and production o f private goods is considered, is the “socially most desirable 
one”. We defined a socially more desirable alternative as the one which is preferred to 
another alternative by the majority of the population. The answer to the above question 
turned out to be negative.
We know that the competitive equilibrium point on the PPF of an economy is not 
the only efficient one; moreover there are other points on the PPF which are efficient and 
socially preferred to the competitive equilibrium outcome. This fact encouraged us to ask 
the following question: If  one can design a mechanism under which the majority of the 
society prefers the outcome, that comes to scene using this very mechanism, to the one 
generated by the neo-classical allocation mechanism, why not use it? One can bring the 
criticism that the “private ownership right” is the cornerstone o f the liberalism and of the 
systems where agents are free to make their decisions at the personal level. One answer to 
this question could be that we live under one type of a social contract or another. We also 
know that these contracts are not divine. Hence, selecting the social contract, under which 
we want to live, is a right, too. If  the majority of the society desires the economy to work 
under a mechanism that provides them with a better outcome, why not switching to that 
one.
The central finding of the paper is that, a voting rule that sustains the competitive 
equilibrium as its outcome should be the one under which voters are allocated votes of 
different weights. We also explicitly formulated such voting rule and showed that it is the 
weighted average o f the most preferred points of two groups of voters where the votes 
that the agents in both groups use are the initially given claims over the total income 
stream o f the economy. This last finding helped us answer a couple of questions in our 
mind. One of them is: whether the voting rule that leads to the competitive equilibrium 
outcome, is anonymous. The answer is no. Under such a rule, one man one vote 
procedure leads to a different outcome which is socially more desirable. The only
exception to the statement is where the shares that both groups receive from the total 
income stream are equal, i.e., s,=S2· It is not neutral either.
We also looked at the candidate nomination problem which is almost always 
neglected by the social choice theorists. We believe that determining the candidates to 
vote on is an important process, since restricting the set o f alternatives can lead to 
different outcomes. We showed that this process is manipulable for our model. We also 
provided a Lemma stating that the points declared by the agents are either their most 
preferred ones or to the right of it for A-lovers and to the left o f it for B-lovers.
In Section 4, we considered another approach to look at the process o f resource 
allocation through the use of transfers. We found out that, the market mechanism can also 
be explained, to some extent, by the use o f transfers. We used a one man one vote scheme 
where one of the groups have a number o f agents in the other group vote on the formers’ 
most preferred point. This is accomplished by making these agents exactly as good as at 
their own most preferred points by transferring them a basket o f good A and good B. The 
interesting point to note is that in most o f the cases, this was feasible. A more interesting 
and crucial one was that even after transfers are made, the agents that made the transfers 
received a utility level which is very close to the one they would get at the competitive 
equilibrium point. We concluded that there must be a “grain of truth” in it.
The final thing to note is that there are still a lot of things to do. One probable 
extension could be to look at the case where the number of groups are greater than 2. We 
believe that a voting rule which is very similar to the one we described will prevail. A 
second extension could be to look at the conditions under which declaration of (1,0) as 
the candidates of two groups is a NE. One can also consider the same problem for a wider
class of production and utility functions. A fourth but maybe not the last extension to 
state is to investigate whether a strategy-proof voting scheme to be used for the allocation 
of resources can be designed.
As a last word, we believe that this new area o f research is a very generous one. I 
f  we can make people think about and work on it, this will be the most promising 
accomplishment for us.
Appendices
• We show here that there is a price vector that satisfies equations (10).
n,X\  +n^X]  =a K{  
n^Xl+n^Xl
We substitute in the explicit forms of the demand functions and let Pa= 1. After 
cancellations are made, we have the following:
(«iJiOf, + («,s,a, = i
aU{P,by
Let z = + {PsbY  and u = n^ s^  «1 +ri2S2CC2 · Then we have the following equation:
u y z  + ( l  — /  ^uz  ^  , Cancellation gives:
2 V Clz + ——  z -  —----- ^  = 0 . Finally, we have:i-r i -^ry
Now, since all the parameters are positive and the third term in the equation is 
negative, the determinant is positive. The equation has two roots, one positive and one 
negative. The positive root satisfies the market clearing conditions we mentioned.
Here, we summarise the results of the simulations that we undertook. We considered 
an economy consisted o f 100 agents where n, and U2 in each case are the numbers of 
agents belonging to each group and n,+n2=100. For each such case, we have 5 
subcases where the share that group 1 receives from the total produce varies from 20%
to 80%. Moreover, for each of these cases, we considered a discrete space of Cobb- 
Douglas parameters for both groups where a , varies from 0.5 to 0.95 and varies 
from 0.05 to 0.5 with increments o f 0.05. The numbers in the boxes corresponding to 
each case show, in what percentage of the cases considered, the problem has a 
feasible solution.
Linear Case:
niSi
n i il2 20% 40% 50% 60% 80%
50 50 100% 100% 100% 100% 98%
60 40 96% 95% 90% 82% 58%
70 30 96% 89% 82% 74% 44%
80 20 05% 85% 86% 54% 35%
90 10 95% 81% 73% 50% 31%
Concave Case:
niSi
ni ib 20% 40% 50% 60% 80%
50 50 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
60 40 T0D% 100% 100% 100% 88%
70 30 100% 100% 100% 04% 75%
~  80· 20 100% 100% 08% 83% 67%
90 10 100% 100% 06% 82% 50%
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